Indo-US nuclear Deal
Published in B&E
1. 2.. 3... twist!
Is India all set to sell out its strategic interests to meet the growing demands made by Uncle Sam?!
Nine years ago, on May 11 and 13, India had marked its arrival on the global strategic landscape with five underground tests at the Pokhran nuclear range. The event was hailed as the triumph of Indian nationalism over the non-proliferation diktats imposed by the global nuclear club (USA, UK, China, France and Russia). Shakti ‘98 (name of the operation) was celebrated as the reassertion of India’s independent decision-making ability in a largely unipolar world. Although, the pre-test preparations were carried out under total secrecy and the execution was clandestinely conducted, the post-test announcements to the world were loud and clear. The Indian public was empathically informed by administration that the nuclear tests were carried out by effectively evading the US satellites and hoodwinking the CIA. However, the euphoria was short-lived, Pakistan conducted almost similar test on 15 May, albeit with a tacit understanding with the United States. The important question, which the chain of events leading to the nuclear test in 1998 and the subsequent attempts by the US administration to “cap or roll back” the Indian nuclear ambition leads to, was the US administration really caught napping on 11 May 1998? Or was it a deliberate attempt by the US to turn a blind eye to the Indian nuclear escapades and offer it a loose rope to hang with. Scores of SIGINT (signal intelligence) and HUMINT (human intelligence) sources feed the US administration, especially on the nuclear proliferation; this makes it hard to swallow that the US was unaware of the Indian nuclear blasts. Even if we agree that the US intelligence networks were prevented from reading the Indian designs, how does one explain the post-Pokhran US behaviour vis-à-vis the Indian dreams?
Immediately, after the blasts, the US imposed sanctions on India, which were gradually eased in the beginning of the 21st century. This strategy was buttressed by catapulting India to a status of global power and thus appealing and appeasing the Indian elite. The whole drama about India as the future ‘super power’ culminated with, July 18, 2005, civilian nuclear agreement between President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Without reading between the lines, the so-called doyens of Indian strategic community began to shout out that India has been granted the status of a ‘nuclear weapon state’. Although the left-liberals and the concerned scientific community did raise hackles about the actual US intentions, but their voice was drowned in the din. The net result is that two years after the July 18 agreement; the Hyde Act & numerous bilateral talks, India is slowly, but gradually, beginning to comprehend the true US government’s intentions to lure into a deal which primarily intends to put a lid over India’s strategic options, limiting its ability to conduct further nuclear tests. As the growing opposition within the US about approving India’s entry into the exulted nuclear club gains momentum, a feeling of being cheated is beginning to dawn upon the Indian decision-makers. That after 9 years of the carrying out nuclear blasts, India is yet to have in place a ‘credible nuclear deterrent’; develop a viable command & control infrastructure; suggests that India is a reluctant nuclear power, lacking the will to occupy the nuclear high table. Despite these glaring indicators, Project Director Pokharn II and former Director of IDSA, K. Santhanam, is still sanguine about the prospects of India’s nuclear weapons programme, while talking to B&E, he opined “All is not that bad on the nuclear weaponisation front. We are moving gradually, but definitively on fitting the nuclear warheads on our missiles and this would be achieved sooner rather than later.” This probably makes him more confident about the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, he adds that ‘one need not be unduly perturbed of the concerns about giving US the leverage over our reactors.” But don’t we have enough reasons to be concerned when Henry Sokolski, Head of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre, a Washington think tank, devoted to nuclear issues says that, “The Indians are being greedy.” “All that India is asking is, the prerogative of determining the future nuclear tests should rest with New Delhi. The 123 bilateral agreement should not incorporate a clause forcing India to make a de jure commitment to keep away from testing.” said, Dr. Kalyan Raman, member of the Indian delegation at Carnegie Endowment Forum for global issues, while talking to B&E. Agreeing to the US wishes on ‘testing’ would tantamount to signing the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) without being a party to it. All along, India has been opposed to joining the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and CTBT, on the grounds that these treaties encourage “nuclear apartheid” and are primarily designed to preserve the nuclear inequity in the world. Coming to a bi-lateral understanding with the US on this particular issue is bound to harm India’s strategic interest in the long-run.Another contentious issue in the proposed 123 deal relates to the civilian nuclear energy aspect. Those who are favouring the deal, argue that energising our nuclear reactors through a continuous supply of enriched uranium from the US will help us diversify our energy resources & enable us to get the latest nuclear technology. What these shenanigans are forgetting is that nuclear energy provides less than 2% (perhaps, the 123 deal may help this figure to rise unto 7%) of the energy requirements of the country. But what if the US chokes the supply lines? The moot is, does India agree to be a vassal state of the US empire? Are we ready to genuflect in front of Bush and his team? If the Indian government were to sign the 123 Agreement without retaining the right to keep its strategic options open, it will be the greatest betrayal in the history of independent India. If after 60 years of independence we still lack courage to stand up for our rights as a sovereign nation, then we definitely don’t deserve to dream big & play a crucial role in world affairs.
Nine years ago, on May 11 and 13, India had marked its arrival on the global strategic landscape with five underground tests at the Pokhran nuclear range. The event was hailed as the triumph of Indian nationalism over the non-proliferation diktats imposed by the global nuclear club (USA, UK, China, France and Russia). Shakti ‘98 (name of the operation) was celebrated as the reassertion of India’s independent decision-making ability in a largely unipolar world. Although, the pre-test preparations were carried out under total secrecy and the execution was clandestinely conducted, the post-test announcements to the world were loud and clear. The Indian public was empathically informed by administration that the nuclear tests were carried out by effectively evading the US satellites and hoodwinking the CIA. However, the euphoria was short-lived, Pakistan conducted almost similar test on 15 May, albeit with a tacit understanding with the United States. The important question, which the chain of events leading to the nuclear test in 1998 and the subsequent attempts by the US administration to “cap or roll back” the Indian nuclear ambition leads to, was the US administration really caught napping on 11 May 1998? Or was it a deliberate attempt by the US to turn a blind eye to the Indian nuclear escapades and offer it a loose rope to hang with. Scores of SIGINT (signal intelligence) and HUMINT (human intelligence) sources feed the US administration, especially on the nuclear proliferation; this makes it hard to swallow that the US was unaware of the Indian nuclear blasts. Even if we agree that the US intelligence networks were prevented from reading the Indian designs, how does one explain the post-Pokhran US behaviour vis-à-vis the Indian dreams?
Immediately, after the blasts, the US imposed sanctions on India, which were gradually eased in the beginning of the 21st century. This strategy was buttressed by catapulting India to a status of global power and thus appealing and appeasing the Indian elite. The whole drama about India as the future ‘super power’ culminated with, July 18, 2005, civilian nuclear agreement between President George Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. Without reading between the lines, the so-called doyens of Indian strategic community began to shout out that India has been granted the status of a ‘nuclear weapon state’. Although the left-liberals and the concerned scientific community did raise hackles about the actual US intentions, but their voice was drowned in the din. The net result is that two years after the July 18 agreement; the Hyde Act & numerous bilateral talks, India is slowly, but gradually, beginning to comprehend the true US government’s intentions to lure into a deal which primarily intends to put a lid over India’s strategic options, limiting its ability to conduct further nuclear tests. As the growing opposition within the US about approving India’s entry into the exulted nuclear club gains momentum, a feeling of being cheated is beginning to dawn upon the Indian decision-makers. That after 9 years of the carrying out nuclear blasts, India is yet to have in place a ‘credible nuclear deterrent’; develop a viable command & control infrastructure; suggests that India is a reluctant nuclear power, lacking the will to occupy the nuclear high table. Despite these glaring indicators, Project Director Pokharn II and former Director of IDSA, K. Santhanam, is still sanguine about the prospects of India’s nuclear weapons programme, while talking to B&E, he opined “All is not that bad on the nuclear weaponisation front. We are moving gradually, but definitively on fitting the nuclear warheads on our missiles and this would be achieved sooner rather than later.” This probably makes him more confident about the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal, he adds that ‘one need not be unduly perturbed of the concerns about giving US the leverage over our reactors.” But don’t we have enough reasons to be concerned when Henry Sokolski, Head of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Centre, a Washington think tank, devoted to nuclear issues says that, “The Indians are being greedy.” “All that India is asking is, the prerogative of determining the future nuclear tests should rest with New Delhi. The 123 bilateral agreement should not incorporate a clause forcing India to make a de jure commitment to keep away from testing.” said, Dr. Kalyan Raman, member of the Indian delegation at Carnegie Endowment Forum for global issues, while talking to B&E. Agreeing to the US wishes on ‘testing’ would tantamount to signing the CTBT (Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty) without being a party to it. All along, India has been opposed to joining the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and CTBT, on the grounds that these treaties encourage “nuclear apartheid” and are primarily designed to preserve the nuclear inequity in the world. Coming to a bi-lateral understanding with the US on this particular issue is bound to harm India’s strategic interest in the long-run.Another contentious issue in the proposed 123 deal relates to the civilian nuclear energy aspect. Those who are favouring the deal, argue that energising our nuclear reactors through a continuous supply of enriched uranium from the US will help us diversify our energy resources & enable us to get the latest nuclear technology. What these shenanigans are forgetting is that nuclear energy provides less than 2% (perhaps, the 123 deal may help this figure to rise unto 7%) of the energy requirements of the country. But what if the US chokes the supply lines? The moot is, does India agree to be a vassal state of the US empire? Are we ready to genuflect in front of Bush and his team? If the Indian government were to sign the 123 Agreement without retaining the right to keep its strategic options open, it will be the greatest betrayal in the history of independent India. If after 60 years of independence we still lack courage to stand up for our rights as a sovereign nation, then we definitely don’t deserve to dream big & play a crucial role in world affairs.
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